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Could the Allies have won without the US in WWII?

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While it is quite obvious at this point that the us didn't come in and kick everyone's ass and did all the work, I still think the US was necessary for the allies to win.

1. The US supplied tons of supplies that the British wouldn't have been able to get by themselves.

2. The Pacific Theater would never have been won without the United States. The British, most notably after the fall of Singapore and Burma, have shown to be ineffective against the Japanese. The Japanese would have conquered both China and India and probably even Australia. Once Japan completed their empire, they would have joined Germany to destroy the USSR. With the USSR fighting on two fronts, that would have been the destruction of the allies and they would have had to concede defeat.

For these two reasons, I believe the US was absolutely necessary in WWII.

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The US helped fight the Japanese. They were important in keeping the Japs from taking over Asia.

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Once the Battle of Britain had been won the result was inevitable

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The most valuable things the Americans supplied were eager fighters and cash. Which is just another repeat of the events which led to such bitter anti-Americanism especially in France (justified or not, your interpretation) after both World Wars in that the Allied powers had to shovel themselves in debt to further entrench themselves in wars while America snatched away more of their industry. Not even to mention pretty much all the money that went out of America to the Allies instantly came back anyway in supply orders; after all that, America would then also demand repayment of these loans to the extent that rationing and austerity had to be maintained for years so America could make double on the war debts to their supposed allies and prosper massively on the back of European losses. This austerity regime would be maintained for the longest possible time until they were bankrupt and/ or on the verge of political collapse and the likes of the Dawes Plan and the Marshall Plan were installed to stop revolution. This brings me to another point, if the Chinese were to use their holding of American debt to the extent that the Americans used the provisions of the Marshall Plan to leverage things from policy to going to war in Europe after WW2, Americans would be (quite rightfully so) outraged. A few things are different, of course: the European debt was created to defend their nation's sovereignty against a genocidal army which wiped out their towns, their homes, their families; American debt roots from wonky fiscal policy in the search to create further tax cuts.

The Japanese advance was greatly fed by the desire to remove the European colonial influence from Asia, yet Japan's emphasis on the Yamato and Han races of East Asia ultimately makes such influence hard to translate as their conquest headed into Bengali areas, despite similar nationalism breaking out in the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, major Japanese advances through Burma were greatly repelled by the Commonwealth forces involved in some of the greatest (and most underrated) fighting in the war, such as in Imphal, and long after the fall of Burma and Singapore. Even though Japan were able to take the coast and many major cities along the coast, these areas were Japan's most effective attack point and on the easiest terrain to fight on and still required a merciless murdering machine to work. Inland China and the countryside are even tougher nuts to crack (so to say) and it would take an even more horrific method of conquest if the Japanese were to be able to pacify these areas. Even Mao spent decades leading a murdering and propaganda machine in these areas during his supposed Liberation Era which preceded the well-defined excesses on the Cultural Revolution in terms of bodycount.

Of course, the British simply did not have the capacity to contribute meaningfully to the Pacific Theatre in the way America did. However I would say that the American contribution to the war was ultimately intended as a means to limit Soviet gains in Europe (e.g. the troop buildup in Britain for D-Day for a West-centric assault) and in Asia (the correlation of the Soviets declaring war on Japan and the American nuclear bombings) as well as use their future political power to dismantle colonial empires and expand the American sphere in the power vacuum the British and French left behind.

If push came to shove, the British could have botched some deal together to translate the land they gained during the war into something more productive for the wider war economy (which seems highly under-utilised outside of the United Kingdom itself) although this may have been a resource vacuum itself like the Eastern European lands Germany gained from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and so American support would be the best to implement.



Last edited by Yobobo on Sun Jan 12, 2014 3:43 am; edited 1 time in total

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Yobobo wrote:However I would say that the American contribution to the war was ultimately intended as a means to limit Soviet gains in Europe (e.g. the troop buildup in Britain for D-Day for a West-centric assault) and in Asia (the correlation of the Soviets declaring war on Japan and the American nuclear bombings) as well as use their future political power to dismantle colonial empires and expand the American sphere in the power vacuum the British and French left behind.

That's quite a stretch. The war wasn't decided until 1943, and by that time America had already intervened greatly in both Europe (North Africa and Italy) and Asia (Midway and others. Considering Japan was a naval empire this was more important than anything achieved in China or the Raj).
I'm sure the US was following its own Imperialist policy in the war, but first they had to earn their right to jingoism.

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History0 wrote:
Yobobo wrote:However I would say that the American contribution to the war was ultimately intended as a means to limit Soviet gains in Europe (e.g. the troop buildup in Britain for D-Day for a West-centric assault) and in Asia (the correlation of the Soviets declaring war on Japan and the American nuclear bombings) as well as use their future political power to dismantle colonial empires and expand the American sphere in the power vacuum the British and French left behind.

That's quite a stretch. The war wasn't decided until 1943, and by that time America had already intervened greatly in both Europe (North Africa and Italy) and Asia (Midway and others. Considering Japan was a naval empire this was more important than anything achieved in China or the Raj).
I'm sure the US was following its own Imperialist policy in the war, but first they had to earn their right to jingoism.

Yes, and such intervention was tactically timed so Britain was more or less bankrupt and would have to fall in line with America's debt-leveraged imperialism after the war.

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Tactically timed? I don't think it was even possible to enter the war sooner, given the domestic situation.

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History0 wrote:Tactically timed? I don't think it was even possible to enter the war sooner, given the domestic situation.

Domestic politics is a matter of simple manipulation, if the will of the Roosevelt Administration had been to enter earlier then they would have manipulated the situation to provoke their entry. Indeed, this was a nation where the majority of people supported prohibition, despite all the obvious signs the policy would be a disaster; if they could be so greatly convinced by the likes of the Anti-Saloon League's hardline fallacies, then why not the entrance to war?

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wat


Entering a war is no easy thing, especially taking the Depression into account.

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The final burden of the Depression was unemployment, which drastically fell once America cashed in on the wartime demand and military recruitment.

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Which happened after it entered the war, not before it.

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Uh no. Unemployment fell under the New Deal, but by no means near the proportion to the growth of output that America had under the reforms. Indeed, unemployment went through another rise/fall in the late '30s but recovered from that regardless and growth was further underpinned by wartime demand.

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Even then, America was not back at pre 1929 levels, and that combined with popular and also political (Roosevelt's opinion was not common among the legislators) lead to entering the war being a hard decision to make.

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